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One of the main global economic concerns before the financial crisis was the 
presence of large “global imbalances,” which refer to the massive and persis-
tent current account deficits experienced by the United States and financed by 
the periphery . This concern was intellectually grounded on the devastating cri-
ses often experienced by emerging market economies that run chronic current 
account deficits . The main trigger of these crises is the abrupt macroeconomic 
adjustment needed to deal with a sudden reversal in the net capital inflows that 
supported the previous expansion and current account deficits (the so-called 
“sudden stops”) . The fear was that the U .S . would experience a similar fate, 
which would unavoidably drag the world economy into a deep recession .
As we all know, the crisis eventually came, and it came with more force 
than we all anticipated . However, the mechanism did not at all resemble the 
feared sudden stop, as quite the opposite occurred . During the crisis, net capital 
inflows to the U .S . were a stabilizing rather than a destabilizing force . The U .S . 
as a whole never experienced, not even remotely, an external funding problem .
Some pre-crisis imbalance critics have chosen to ignore the inconvenient 
fact that their anticipated mechanism played no role in the crisis, choosing 
instead to take the credit for the realization of the forecast of doom . One can 
feel the tension in the current paper: At times Maury and Ken are tempted to 
go the self-gratifying “I told you so” route, but they are intellectually too solid 
to do so, and hence they pull themselves out of it . Deeply at heart they still feel 
that global imbalances did it, but they also know that they need to find a differ-
ent mechanism from the conventional sudden stop story if they are to match   
the facts .
I am not sure they have yet found a fully coherent mechanism, but this is 
fine since at this time no one can credibly claim to know exactly what happened . 
They want to blame it on economic policy here and abroad, but the story still 
needs more work to be fully convincing and serve as a guide to policy . In the 
body of the paper they talk about misguided sterilization policies in Asia that 
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facilitated postponing the reversal of loose monetary policy in the U .S ., which in 
turn fueled the savings glut by boosting commodity prices .
But we know that the full story can be told without reference to monetary 
policy, just as a result of expansion and contraction of asset supply and demand 
around the world (see Caballero et al . 2008a,b) . The paper argues against a nar-
row version of such a model which only considers asset demand (the savings glut 
story) . I believe their evidence based on timing of events is consistent with the 
implications of the full demand-supply model . Thus, we still need more work to 
disentangle the relative importance of these stories .
In their conclusion they are more balanced and argue that financial under-
development in China is one of the main sources of the global imbalances .1 But 
if so, what is the right policy with respect to global imbalances in the short run 
given these structural problems? And in particular, what is the form of optimal 
monetary policy? I could imagine scenarios where the optimal monetary pol-
icy is to be more expansionary than in the absence of the structural problems, 
in order to prevent deflationary forces from developing (Caballero 2006) . In any 
event, I couldn’t get a good sense from the paper on how to answer these impor-
tant questions, and we certainly need answers for them  .  .  . or at least I hope 
that we do seek them before rushing into implementing antiglobal imbalances 
policies .
Despite this general unease with the paper and its policy implications, I 
must admit that there are many great lines in it . One of my favorites is, “In 
effect, the global imbalances posed stress tests for weaknesses in the United 
States, British, and other advanced-country financial and political systems—
tests that those countries did not pass .  .  .  .” Brilliantly said, I fully agree with 
them . Although probably what they mean is a bit different from what I mean by 
the test, its failure, and how to move forward, thus I want to spend the rest of 
my comments developing my views on these things .
I believe that the root imbalance was not the global imbalance but a safe- 
assets imbalance: The entire world, including foreign central banks and inves-
tors, as well as many U .S . financial institutions, had an insatiable demand for 
safe debt instruments, which put an enormous pressure on the U .S . financial 
system and its incentives (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2009) . This is the 
stress test the U .S . economy failed .
Within this perspective the main mechanism prior to the crisis worked as 
follows: As the demand for safe assets began to rise above what the U .S . cor-
porate world and safe mortgage borrowers naturally could provide, financial 
institutions began to search for mechanisms to generate AAA assets from pre-
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but in order to produce safe assets from their high-risk loans, “banks” had to 
create complex instruments and conduits that relied on the law of large num-
bers and issuing a tranche of their liabilities . Similar instruments were created 
from securitization of all sorts of payment streams, ranging from car to student 
loans . Along the way, and reflecting the value associated with creating financial 
instruments from them, the price of real estate and other assets in short supply 
rose sharply . A positive feedback loop was created, as the rapid appreciation of 
the underlying assets seemed to justify a large AAA tranche for derivative col-
lateralized debt obligations and related products . Credit rating agencies con-
tributed to this loop, and so did greed and misguided homeownership policies, 
but they probably were not the root cause .
From a systemic point of view, this newfound source of AAA assets was 
much riskier than the traditional single-name highly rated bonds . As Coval et 
al . (2009) show, for a given unconditional probability of default, a highly rated 
tranche made of lower quality underlying assets will tend to default, in fact it 
can only default, during a systemic event . This means that, even if correctly 
rated as AAA, the correlation between these complex assets distress and sys-
temic distress is much higher than for simpler single-name bonds .
The systemic fragility of these instruments became a source of systemic 
risk in itself once a significant share of them was kept within the financial sys-
tem rather than sold to final investors . Banks and their structured investment 
vehicles (SIVs), attracted by the high return and low capital requirement combi-
nation provided by the senior and super-senior tranches of structured products, 
kept them on their books and, once satiated, began to pass their (perceived) 
infinitesimal risk onto the monolines and insurance companies (AIG, in partic-
ular) . Through this process, the core of the financial system became intercon-
nected in increasingly complex ways and vulnerable to a systemic event .
Much of the crisis is blamed on the crash of the real estate “bubble” and the 
rise in subprime mortgage defaults that followed it . But this cannot be all, or 
even much, of it . The global financial system went into cardiac arrest mode and 
was on the verge of imploding more than once, which seems hard to attribute 
to a relatively small shock such as the real estate/subprime combo . Instead, the 
real damage came from the unexpected and sudden freezing of the entire secu-
ritization industry . In a moment’s notice, confidence vanished and the complex-
ity which made possible the “multiplication of bread” during the boom, turned 
into a source of counterparty risk, both real and imaginary . Senior and super-
senior tranches were no longer perceived as invulnerable, and worsening mat-
ters, banks had to bring back onto their balance sheets more of this new risk 
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and pervasive flights to quality plagued the financial system . Fear fed into more 
fear, and caused reluctance to engage in financial transactions, even among the 
prime financial institutions .
Along the way, the underlying structural deficit of safe assets that was 
behind the whole cycle worsened as the newly found source of AAA assets from 
the securitization industry dried up, and the spike in perceived uncertainty 
further increased demand for these assets . Safe interest rates plummeted to 
record low levels .
As I said, global imbalances and their feared sudden reversal never played 
a significant role during this deep crisis . In fact, the worse things became, the 
more both domestic and foreign investors ran for cover to U.S. Treasuries . 
Instead, the largest reallocation of funds was across asset classes, in particular 
from complex to simple safe instruments .
From this perspective the core policy problem to deal with is how to bridge 
the safe-asset gap without overexposing the financial sector to systemic risk . 
Raising capital requirements is a knee-jerk policy reaction to reduce vulner-
ability, but it does not help to deal with the structural problem of excess safe-
asset demand . Quite the opposite, by reducing the financial sector’s ability to 
grow its balance sheet, it will worsen the safe-asset gap . The cost of this pol-
icy distortion is stronger headwinds for the recovery and the risk that the same 
pattern of systemically vulnerable safe-asset creation may migrate into the 
shadow financial sector or elsewhere in the world that is even less prepared to 
absorb the systemic risk . We need a more balanced response, trading off vul-
nerability reduction and the safe-asset gap, to determine the socially optimal 
level of capital requirements (which may well be higher than the pre-crisis lev-
els, especially for illiquid assets) and complementary measures .
To be clear, the main failure was not so much in the private sector’s abil-
ity to create AAA assets through complex financial engineering as it was in the 
systemic vulnerability created by this process . We should preserve the good 
parts of this process while finding a mechanism to relocate the systemic risk 
component generated by this asset creation activity away from banks and into 
private investors (for small and medium-size shocks) and the government (for 
tail events) . This transfer should be done on an ex ante basis and for a fair fee, 
which can incorporate any concerns with the size, complexity, and nationality 
of specific financial institutions . There are many options to do so, all of which 
amount to some form of partially mandated insurance provision from the gov-
ernment to the financial sector against systemic events (see, e .g ., Caballero and 
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To conclude, while there are many good points in the paper, as one would 
expect from two stellar academics, I do not think the paper identifies the core 
of the policy problem we need to address . There is no doubt that global imbal-
ances exacerbated the safe-assets imbalance, since emerging markets have a 
particularly severe deficiency in producing safe assets, but the real problem is 
this deficiency not the global imbalances per se . We should not get distracted 
with secondary illnesses .
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NOTE
1 Which, incidentally, is the main point in Caballero et al . (2008a,b) . Contrary to the claim 
in the current paper, we did not argue that global imbalances were desirable . We simply 
pointed out that the causes behind them were more structural than it was typically assumed 
at the time . In particular, we emphasized the financial underdevelopment of emerging Asia 
and commodity producing economies, and the subpar growth of continental Europe .